Equity research - Arsenal Holdings PLC by Salvado, André Filipe Leitão
 
i 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 
FINANCE 
 
 
 
MASTER´S FINAL WORK 
PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
EQUITY RESEARCH: 
ARSENAL HOLDINGS PLC 
 
 
 
 
ANDRÉ FILIPE LEITÃO SALVADO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 2019 
 
 
ii 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 
FINANCE 
 
 
MASTER´S FINAL WORK 
PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
EQUITY RESEARCH: 
ARSENAL HOLDINGS PLC 
 
 
ANDRÉ FILIPE LEITÃO SALVADO 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: 
ANTÓNIO CARLOS DE OLIVEIRA SAMAGAIO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 2019
 
I 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This project was written in accordance with the CFA Institute guideline recommendations as well as the ISEG´s master’s 
in finance final work project standards. A detailed analysis of Arsenal Holdings PLC was done. The analyzed company 
was selected by me based on his recent acquisition by Kroenke Sports & Entertainment UK Inc, looking a good starting 
point for a challenging valuation on an interesting industry with some attractive acquisitions over the years. Arsenal 
Holdings Limited is the holding of an English football club, Arsenal F.C that competes for top football trophies. The 
purpose of this project is to issue a financial opinion about the acquisition value paid for the company by calculating a 
target price.  
Through FCFF approach a final valuation of £1,840.52m was reached, meaning a discount of 0.6% in the acquisition 
value paid. The result was supported by a complementary relative valuation. 
All the information and data applied in this project was publicly available. 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
Resumo 
 
Este projeto foi escrito de acordo com as recomendações de diretrizes do Instituto CFA, bem como as normas do 
projeto final de mestrado em finanças do ISEG. Foi feita uma análise detalhada do Arsenal Holdings PLC. A empresa 
analisada foi selecionada por mim com base na sua recente aquisição pela Kroenke Sports & Entertainment UK Inc, 
parecendo um bom ponto de partida para uma avaliação desafiante em um setor interessante com algumas aquisições 
atractivas ao longo dos anos. O Arsenal Holdings Limited é a holding de um clube de futebol inglês, o Arsenal F.C, que 
compete pelos principais troféus de futebol. O objetivo deste projeto é emitir uma opinião financeira sobre o valor de 
aquisição pago pela empresa, calculando um preço-alvo. 
Através da abordagem FCFF, foi atingida uma avaliação final de £1,840.52m, significando um desconto de 0.6% no 
valor de aquisição pago. O resultado foi apoiado por uma avaliação relativa complementar. 
Todas as informações e dados aplicados neste projeto estavam disponíveis públicamente. 
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Table 1: AFC Market Profile 
1. Research Snapshot 
 
 Arsenal Holdings PLC was totally acquired by Kroenke Sports & Entertainment 
for £29,419.64 and according to my valuation this price was paid with a 
discount of 0.6% since my target price was £29,582.24. 
 
  
Arsenal Holdings PLC, with the AFC ticker symbol, was publicity listed at NEX 
Exchange Growth Market, but on 5 October 2018 the company was re-registered 
as a private company as all the shares were acquired by Kroenke Sports & 
Entertainment UK Inc (KSE UK Inc). KSE UK Inc already held 41,743 AFC 
shares, which represents 67.09% of the 62,217 issued shares. For each of the 
remaining AFC shares, a value of £29,419.64 in cash was paid. AFC operates in 
the Consumer Discretionary Sector, Recreation Facilities Industry most precisely 
at Entertainment Facilities sub-industry, which includes the football segment. 
Arsenal shares showed very low liquidity as just 56 shares were traded during 
the six months prior KSE UK Inc offer, which could be the result of the poor 
floating rate with just 1,779 shares outstanding when subtracting the amount 
detained by KSE UK Inc and Red and White Securities, Alisher Usmanov's 
company (Table 1; Figure 1). 
Perfect Geographic Location- Although Arsenal have not been able to win titles 
through last seasons, revenues continued to rise mainly due to broadcasting 
rights from top tier English league and European tournaments, with a historical 
average YoY increase of 10.51% since 2014 till 2018. Commercial Revenues 
with a historical average YoY of 8.50% during the same timeline demonstrate the 
globalization of the club with an increasing number of fans worldwide. (Figure 2)   
Infrastructures vs Debt- Investment in infrastructures were done by Arsenal, 
currently owning Emirates stadium, a redeveloped training center and a 
developed youth academy. No more investments are expected in sports facilities. 
The debt contracted were the result of the stadium financing, so the tendency is 
to reduce the debt as no other extraordinary investment is needed. 
 
  
Date: 6/08/2018   Acquisition Price: £29,419.64 Observation: Acquisition price 0.6% below target price 
Ticker: AFC PZ  Target Price: £29,582.24   
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Figure 3: AFC chests 
Source: AFC & AS computation 
2. Business Description 
 
Arsenal Holdings Limited is a London based group, being the main activity 
competing in professional football competitions, both at domestic and European 
level, represented by The Arsenal Football Club PLC, a subsidiary company. 
Arsenal Holdings Limited has 100% control of nineteen subsidiary companies, 
directly or indirectly, operating in the football industry ramifications or in the 
property development area due to the stadium construction (Appendix 12). 
 
The club was founded in 1886 by a group of Woolwich Arsenal Armament 
Factory workers, which later would become the actual Arsenal Football Club. The 
club had different chests and official names, staying in the historical records Dial 
Square, Woolwich Arsenal and finally in 1915 Arsenal FC, remaining till today 
(Figure 3). The first game of the club was played in the late 1886 however the 
first official trophies were won in 1930, with a double mark, winning his first FA 
Cup and English league. At this moment the club has an enviable honours history 
with 45 trophies within which can be highlighted the record of fourteen FA Cup 
trophies, the largest number between all the English clubs (Table 2).  
 
Strategy   
The Arsenal Football Club board has an ambitious objective for the club future, 
be one of the best and must recognized clubs worldwide. To do that, the board 
members have created a long-term self-sustained business strategy, composed 
by four phases being win trophies the key objective. The pitch success leads to 
an uplift of the fan base, increasing the revenues which in turn are reinvested on 
the Principal Team in order to continuously follow the glory inside the field, 
ultimately translated in trophies (Figure 4) 
 
Financial and Non-Financial Key Performance Indicators  
  
Last season was full of nothing for Arsenal Team  
The performance on the field is the first one to look at. On the previous season 
the performance was not the desired, with no trophy and a sixth-place in the 
Premier League (PL), which just gave access to participate on UEFA Europe 
League (UCL) instead of the UEFA Champions League (UCL), finishing the long 
journey of successive qualifications for this competition between 1998/99 and 
2016/17 performing a total of nineteen, which is the English record. The best in 
terms of sportive performance was reach the UEL semi-final, just beaten by the 
tournament winner, Atlético Madrid. 
 
Premier League and UEFA presence are essential to achieve success 
 
Arsenal has the possibility to play in the PL and UEFA competitions due to his 
location, which are the most recognized football clubs’ competitions, depending 
of on-pitch success. The huge visibility of these competitions leads to high 
broadcasting payments, which have contributed with 47% of Arsenal operating 
revenues (Figure5).  
  
Arsenal popularity as a global brand  
Arsenal popularity can be evaluated by looking to match attendance ratio 
translated in matchday revenue, social media followers and ultimately 
commercial deals. With a total of 60,260 seats, the Emirates stadium had an 
annual average attendance of 99% on each of the last three seasons accounting 
with 25% of operating Revenue (Figure 5). Social media is a new tool to reach 
additional fans or to create a more personal relationship with the actual 
supporters, and Arsenal is using these modern instruments very well, being one 
of the fifteen clubs with greatest number of followers on the principal’s social 
media. The club has the incredible number of 38m, 10m and 9.6m followers on 
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram respectively, with the major part of the followers 
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Figure 4: AFC board strategy 
Source: AFC 
Figure 5: AFC FY18 Revenues 
Source: AFC & AS computation 
based in Asia, mainly driven by the supporters of Indonesia. World class players 
can boost the popularity of the club, by attracting new fans that follow the player 
career. Mesut Özil with 31m, 24m and 18m followers is the Arsenal player with 
most followers, showing the importance of having top players, not just to improve 
the results inside the pitch but also outside it. As a worldwide brand, Arsenal 
recognition is an incentive for sponsors to be affiliated with the club, which can 
be seen by the new contract with Adidas as kit manufacture sponsor, starting 
in 2019/20 season for a period of five years, with the club receiving a total of 
£300m, the Fly Emirates partnership renewal with the value of £200m for shirt 
sponsorship, or even the “Visit Rwanda” sleeve sponsor three years contract with 
the value of £30m, starting in 2018/19 (Table 7). Commercial revenues were 
responsible for 28% of total operating Revenues (Figure 5). 
 
Acquisition and retention of Key Players 
Transfer fees and wage cost are the way to get a competitive team for fighting to 
win football trophies. Arsenal have made an effort and the additional transfer 
value of £165.8m in 2017/18 was the result of the acquisition of players like 
Alexandre Lacazette and Pierre Emerick Aubameyang, breaking twice the club 
record in transfers fees, with the amounts of £57.38m and £47.70m (Appendix 
7). These two players as well as Mesut Özil three-and-a-half-year contract 
renovation have contributed to an increase on the payroll costs of 11.8%. Staff 
costs to operating revenue was 62%. and staff costs to operating costs was 50%  
Although the wage cost of the club had increased 20% last season, from £199.4m 
in 2017 to £240.06m in 2018, or 12% if excluding exceptional, which is one of the 
main contributors of the Group expenses, the Profit after tax increased to 
£56.5milion in 2017/2018 season comparing to £35.3m on the previous season. 
3. Management & Governance 
  
Board Structure and members 
The board of directors is composed by five directors instead of six, after the 
resignation of I.E Gazidis on October 31, 2018. The directors need to be re-
elected after serving the club on the Board during a period of three years, being 
the members in functions: Sir Chips Keswick, Ken Friar OBE, Lord Harris of 
Peckham, Stan Kroenke and his son Josh Kroenke. The board members must 
decide the long-term strategy and objectives of the Club and also analyze the 
Group performance, helped by financial statements. Arsenal is based in UK and 
so is subject to internal laws for companies, done by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, in this case the Companies Act 2006, the main basis of company law 
in UK. 
Sir Chips Keswick was elected Arsenal Holdings Limited’s Chairman in June 
2013, continuing the journey started in November 2005 as an Arsenal director. 
He had a prestigious career as banker for over 50 years, accumulating an 
impressive number of director positions such as Chairman of Hambros Bank 
1986-1998 and Bank of England 1993-2001. 
Mr. Ken Friar OBE has been with Arsenal for 60 years and presently is one of 
the 5 Directors, the one with the longest career at the Club, having done almost 
every job. 
Lord Harris of Peckham was selected to be part of the Arsenal board as Director 
in November 2005. He was a young entrepreneur linked with the carpet retail. 
Nowadays support a charity projects and activities to helping the development of 
young kids. 
Stan Kroenke has started is connection with Arsenal in 2007. Since April 2008 
he is board director, obtaining a majority equity position in 2011. He is owner of 
Arsenal since is the holder of Kroenke Sports & Entertainment UK INC. His 
company owns clubs in different sports such as the Denver Nuggets of National 
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Basketball Association, Los Angeles Rams of National Football League, 
Colorado Rapids of Major League Soccer and Colorado Avalanche of National 
Hockey League. 
Josh Kroenke is Director of Arsenal Football Club board, where he has joined in 
December 2013. He is Stan Kroenke son and has a close relationship with all the 
Kroenke Sports & Entertainment UK INC sports clubs, being the Denver Nuggets 
and Colorado Avalanche president. 
 
Sustainability and Social Responsibility  
  
Arsenal’s sustainability strategy is focused in four key areas to achieve an 
ongoing environmental enhancement, having done projects and upgrades in all 
of them: Energy Consumption including the replacement of floodlight and petrol 
pitch mowers to LED floodlight (reducing in 30% the consumption) and to 
electrical pitch mowers; Waste Management & Disposal including the supervision 
of the suppliers in order to reduce the environmental impact due to their products 
or transportation, intention to use recycled materials and procedure to waste 
separation on gamedays; Water Consumption including the implementation of 
new system at training ground to recycle irrigation water; Travel by reducing their 
impact on the environment, by suppling the staff with cycling facilities. All these 
policies and operations are evaluated by an Environmental Management System 
(EMS) 
 
4.Industry Overview and Competitive 
Positioning 
 
United Kingdom Economic Outlook  
In the aftermath of an eminent exit of the European Union, UK has been on 
negotiations to have an orderly exit. All the political uncertainty around this 
process leads to a real GDP growth projection of 1.1% in 2019 before rising 
slightly to 1.6% in 2020 (Figure 6).  Through the last three decades London has 
consistently outperformed in terms of economic growth when compared with the 
other regions of UK and this tendency seems to continue in the future with 1,2% 
and 1.8% growth projections to 2019 and 2020. A disorderly ‘no deal’ Brexit could 
lead to a significantly less favorable outcome for growth forecasts. 
 
PESTEL analysis of the Industry 
 
Political factors: European governments can affect the club's financial results 
thought tax law at Foreign and Domestic income, including tax residence 
topics. With a favorable tax law, clubs can offer a bigger wage when compared 
to clubs based in other countries, which can be seen as an advantage to attract 
new key players. UK decision to leave EU has led the value of pound weakness 
against Euro, which leads to higher fees for player transfers from EU but also, on 
the other, increasing the sterling value of European competition distributions paid 
out to clubs by UEFA in Euros.   
 
Economic factors: As we can observe from the financial crisis data (2007-08), 
(Figure 7) the key drivers of profitability did not suffer any decrease, indicating 
that the industry is non-cyclical with an inelastic price demand curve, even with 
negative UK GDP. However, there are some cautions to be taken because a 
downturn of the economy in the future could be followed by an expenditure cut 
of some industries that are interconnected with football industry, leading to a 
decline in the revenues of football companies.   
  
Socio-cultural factors: European football is more diverse than ever, with UEFA 
striving to convey this clear message that football is for everyone. Football bodies 
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Figure 9: Market share of leading Kit 
Manufactures are actively participating in campaigns related to society problems. Promoting 
equality where all people can participate are some of the ideas behind the recent 
UEFA "no to racism" campaign. Also, the latest agreement between Stonewall 
and The Premier League to defend and promote LGBT inclusion not only in 
football but into the society. Football is an industry which protects and defends 
diversity and inclusion across all different ethics, genders, ages, orientations, 
abilities or social backgrounds.   
  
Technological factors: Technological factors enhance football as sport due to 
all the new devices used during the match, like VAR (video assistant referee) or 
goal-line, helping to construct a fair game to all the fans but also improving 
players performance due to EPTS (Electronic performance and Tracking 
Systems). Technology is more important than ever for the clubs because they 
can construct a permanent relationship with supporters, improving financial 
results. Social media platforms or official websites of the clubs can provide an 
excellent chance to not only secure their existing fans, but also attract potential 
ones. Top 15 clubs have an aggregate of 169m, 638m and 272m followers on 
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram with Real Madrid in 1th. 
  
Environmental factors: Although environmental factors are not an alerting topic 
for the industry, football clubs are using their power to alert supports for the 
Climate changes, promoting some campaigns as a form of sensibilization. Some 
clubs like Arsenal has developed a commitment towards environmental 
responsibility. 
 
Legal factors: The main body of European football has created Financial Fair 
Play in 2009 to bring responsibility, rationality and transparency to club's financial 
management. Since 2009, this regulation has helped to reduce to less than 20% 
overdue debts and losses of the European clubs. The environment created 
encourages and attracts investors to look for this industry as it is increasingly 
financial attractive.   
 
SWOT analysis 
 
Strength: Football is the most famous sport in Europe, fascinating fans from all 
around the countries to see the best players who are enticed by the best 
championships, played in Europe. Football visibility is a strength of the 
Industry since attract sponsors from all over the world. High barriers to entry into 
the industry due to league rules ally with supporter’s loyalty permit top clubs to 
continue increasing their name as a global Brand. 
Weaknesses: To have the best players and staff, clubs incurred in elevated 
wage costs with wage to revenues ratios of 55% between PL clubs in 2017, or 
59% among clubs in the Spanish first division (Figure 11). Although the ratio has 
decreased in 2017 when compared with the previous years, the total amount 
spends in wages increased in 18 of 20 best European Leagues.  
Opportunities: The power of the new technologies can be used by football 
clubs, turning the supporters addicted to the club by doing a 
continuous marketing forcing on the social media, creating a more personal 
relationship with fans which can permit an increase of the fan base as well 
as commercial revenues. Economies of scale, which did not appear to be 
possible in the football industry, is a reality due to the multi-club model, already 
used by Red Bull who owns clubs in Austria, Germany, United States and Brazil. 
This model can be very successful due to the possibility of a worldwide 
expansion, diversifying the markets, creating a super structure to scout young 
players and switching them across all the owned clubs. 
Threats: The impediment of participate in the most recognized and lucrative 
competitions due to relegation is a real threat between top-tier clubs, which could 
block them to contract top players because they want to play in top leagues with 
most visibility, to close sponsor contracts or nice broadcast agreements, which 
 
 
6 
 
61% 59%
31%
39% 52%
52%
60% 58%
50% 47%
26% 27%
51%
44% 29%
31%
30%
30%
39% 42%
14%
14%
18%
17%
19%
17%
10%
12%
11% 11%
4 566
4 814
2 408
2 804
2 460
2 719
1 789
1 962
1 4161 497
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018
England Germany Spain Italy France
Broadcasting Sponsorship/Commercial Matchday
Source: Deloitte Football Report & AS 
computation 
53% 53%
61% 59% 59% 58%
29%
30%
26% 27%
28% 28%
17%
17%
14%
14%
13%
14%
3 350
3 639
4 552
4 819
5 050
5 240
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Broadcasting Sponsorship/Commercial Matchday
Figure 13: PL clubs ‘revenues 
Source: Deloitte Football Report & AS 
computation 
58
9
50
3
45
5
44
8
38
9
37
9
24
1
18
9
17
8
17
7
16
0
15
2
15
0
14
0
13
9
13
5
12
8
12
7
12
7
12
7
12
5
28
6
26
0
26
4
24
6
24
0
14
8
14
2
16
0
94 10
7
11
9
11
3
11
7
82 78 10
2
91 86 94 63 92
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
M
an
. U
n
it
ed
M
an
. C
it
y
Li
ve
rp
o
o
l
C
h
el
se
a
A
rs
en
al
To
tt
en
h
am
A
V
ER
A
G
E
Ev
er
to
n
N
ew
ca
st
le
W
es
t 
H
am
Le
ic
es
te
r
So
u
th
am
p
to
n
C
ry
st
al
 P
al
ac
e
B
u
rn
le
y
B
ri
gh
to
n
B
o
u
m
em
o
u
th
Sw
an
se
a 
C
it
y
W
at
fo
rd
St
o
ke
 C
it
y
H
u
d
d
er
sf
ie
ld
W
es
t 
 B
ro
m
w
ic
h
Revenue Wage cost
Figure 14: PL clubs ‘revenues and wage costs 
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Figure 12: Top 5 leagues overview 
could lead the club to a critical financial situation. The development of Chinese 
championship, ranked as the eighth country with highest transfer expenditures 
and also the highest outside Europe, could affect the future of European football 
if clubs would not be able to secure the best players due to salaries or visibility, 
affecting all the revenues sources. The replacement of football as top European 
sport is a possibility in the future which could drastically decrease the visibility of 
the clubs. 
 
The “Porter’s Five Forces” 
  
Bargaining power of Customers - Very Low  
Consumer behavior are very special in the football industry due to loyalty. 
Supporters choose one team and never change for another rival/competitor. 
Bargain power of consumers are very low since demand does not decrease with 
higher prices (price sensitivity), meaning the existence of an inelastic curve of 
demand. During 2007 crisis the clubs continued to increase financial results. 
According to 2008 and 2009 Arsenal reports, the club reached two 
consecutive records of annual retained profit levels.  
  
Threat of new Entrants - Low  
In 2016/17 season 727 clubs were competed in men’s national championships in 
Europe. There are no barriers for new competitors in football industry, but the 
clubs have to start from the bottom division and there are a lot of competition to 
achieve the best league of each country, which can give access to international 
competitions, with better prizes and recognition. It is not easy to achieve top-tier 
competitions due to the rules of each country leagues. The only way to clubs 
enters into the market, top-tier leagues, is to be promoted, and the clubs 
participating in top-tier leagues are aware of the potential promoted clubs. 
  
Threat of Substitute Products - Low  
Football is a live entertainment like theater or others live sports, but fans do not 
prescind to see their football team, for them the final product of the industry, the 
intangible product “football game” cannot be compared with other kinds 
of entertainments. Football is the most followed sport in Europe, and now with 
the increase of interest from new regions around the world, like North America 
and mainly Asia, the football will continue to raise levels, increasing the revenues 
of the industry. The unique Threat is the football himself, with China or American 
championships valorization in the recent years, one day could fascinate more 
attention all around the world, attracting the world best players to play there, 
which could affect the European football, but in the near future these scenario 
does not seem to be a real problem. 
  
Bargaining power of Suppliers - Median  
There are different types of sponsorships across the football industry. Kit 
manufacture and shirt sponsors are the most popular thought the European 
clubs, with all the clubs having manufacturer deals and 88% shirt sponsor across 
the 16 biggest European leagues during 2017/18 season (Figure 10). The 30 
major clubs have as average of kit manufacture and shirt sponsor deal duration 
of 7.9 and 4.4 years respectively. There are 62 different kit manufactures in the 
industry with the two main suppliers sharing 34% of all market (Figure 9). Just 
13% of the clubs changed their kit manufacturer for the 2017/18 season however 
a higher number of clubs have changed the shirt sponsor, 22% or 25% if clubs 
without sponsor were excluded.  
In addition, sleeve sponsor and stadium naming start to become an important 
source of income also, with 56% and 26% across 16 top European leagues with 
closed contracts (Figure10).  
It does not seem to be difficult for clubs change sponsor or supplier when the 
contract finish. However, the amount involved in the contracts is a huge part 
of club's total revenues which gives some power to suppliers.   
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Figure 15:Segmentation of European football 
revenues 
Source: UEFA Club licensing benchmarking 
report & AS computation 
Source: FIFA & AS computation 
Source: UEFA & AS computation 
Table 3:  UEFA Club coefficient Top 10 
 
Competition within the industry - median low  
Customers loyalty, with high emotional switching costs, seems to be an 
impediment for clubs to steal supporters from the other clubs, which decrease 
the competitiveness between them. However, results on the field are a key factor 
for the financial results of the club, meaning that every club wants to win, 
increasing the competition. However, no one wants to see a monopoly league, 
where the winner is known at the beginning of the season which would turn the 
league disinteresting to follow or invest. So, competition is beneficial for the clubs, 
leading to an increase of popularity which would be translated in higher revenues. 
 
Key Drivers of Profitability   
 
Football industry has three main sources of revenue leading clubs to successful 
results throw the years, to know: Broadcasting, Sponsors & Commercial and 
Matchday Revenues. Broadcasting rights are negotiated by the responsible 
bodies for organize the competition, UEFA for international competition like 
UEFA Champions league, Europa League and the UEFA Super Cup, and the 
domestic broadcasting rights are negotiated differently in each country. In UK, 
PL broadcasting rights are negotiated by the PL and half of the total value is 
equally distributed among all the participating clubs, the remaining 50% is divided 
in two parts, 25% for each one: “Facility Fees” based on the frequency of club 
games broadcasted during the season in the UK; "Merit Payments", based on 
the final classification of each club in the PL table. PL International broadcasting 
rights are equally distributed by all the participating clubs. Sponsors & 
Commercial Revenue are dependent on the club historical performance, global 
followers and brand power. Sponsors are interested to close agreements with top 
clubs that share the same values and that could add them value. These revenues 
are mainly supported by sponsorship deals through kit manufacturer, shirt 
sponsor, sleeve sponsor and more recently stadium naming rights. Matchday 
Revenues are translated in the ability of the clubs to generate revenue from the 
football game itself which can include the ticket sales and hospitality sales that 
are dependent on the stadium size, which can limit the stadium attendance. In 
the other hand the major part of expenses is due to staff costs, mainly paid to 
key players of the teams. Staff costs can include variables payments related to 
performance, with bonuses for specific achievements or cuts to poor results.   
 
European key drivers outlook   
 
Cumulative revenues between European clubs showed an increase of 8,47% 
CAGR, an overall increase of 38% since 2013/14 till 2017/18 with ‘Big five’ 
European leagues sharing 55% of European Revenues last season (Figure 15). 
In 2017/18 season the revenues across the ‘Big five’ European leagues clubs 
were driven by domestic broadcasting rights with an average of 51%, 
sponsorship & commercial with 35% and gate receipts with 14% (Figure 12). All 
‘Big five’ European leagues increased the cumulative revenue, 9.1% YoY, as well 
as the wage costs, 16.1% YoY, as a result the wage to revenue ratio increased 
to an average 62%, meaning that the wage cost growth outpaced revenue 
growth. PL continues to lead the rank as the one with highest Revenues as well 
as Wage costs but with the 2th lowest wage to revenue ratio of 59%. 
   
Premier League key drivers outlook  
 
During 2017/18 the average revenue of £241m was reached among PL clubs, 
demonstrating the continually uptrend of the revenues with an increase 
of 5.7% YoY, or 48% when compared to 2013/14. Broadcasting represents 59% 
of total revenues with the ratio between the highest and lowest PL broadcast 
payment of 1.59, between Manchester United and West Bromwich Albion, which 
is a good measure to improve the competitivity (Figure 14). Commercial revenues 
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Figure 17: Top10 Revenue segmentation 
Source: Deloitte Football Report & AS 
computation 
Source: KPMG Football Benchmark & AS 
computation 
Table 4: KPMG EV Top 10 
Table 5: Clubs ‘Operating Revenues Top10 
Source: Deloitte Football Report & AS 
computation 
represented 27% of total revenue with an increase of 11.7% YoY, where all the 
clubs were able to close kit manufacturer, shirt sponsor and sleeve agreements. 
Matchday revenue is the lowest one among PL clubs despite existing more 
people going to the stadium. UK clubs dropped the away ticket prices due to PL 
cap of £30 on away fan ticket, to get prices more accessible to everyone. Match 
attendances grew 7% in 2017/18 season to a total of 14.6m, an average 
matchday attendance of 38,500 and 96% of stadium utilization, with the revenue 
increasing 8%. Total wage costs of PL clubs increased 14.11% to £2,846.9m, 
representing an average of £142m, leading the wage to revenue ratio to 59% 
which is lower than UEFA limit recommendation of 70% but higher than the 
previous season.  
Whilst the PL’s central distribution mechanism remains the most equal amongst 
the ‘big five’ leagues, there remains a significant revenue variance between 
groups of clubs within the league. The ‘big six’ clubs generated an average of 
£415m each in 2016/17, compared to just £147m across the rest of the clubs.  
 
Prospects for the future - UK clubs 
The new cycle of the PL tv rights, starting in 2019/20 and for a period of 3 
seasons, will record an uplift of 8% overall, with the 30% increase of international 
rights offsetting the decline in domestic rights. The new contract will continue to 
guarantee the 1th position as the richest league in the short term. In 2018/19 
starts a new cycle of UEFA broadcasting rights as well as the new qualifying rules 
based on the association coefficient ranking which puts 7 PL’ Teams on UEFA 
tournaments, 4 in the UEFA Champions League and 3 in UEFA Europe League, 
which will increase the overall revenue among PL teams. PL clubs’ revenue are 
expected to rise to £5.05b in 2018/19 and to £5.24b in 2019/20 (Figure13). By 
looking for the wage costs and the final league position it is possible to see a high 
correlation, with all the top 6 having the highest wage costs. Although this 
correlation will lead the clubs to spend more money in wage in order to have the 
best player to fight for the best final position, it is not expected to increase much 
above 60% the wage costs/revenue ratio, which is a good measure to see the 
profitability of the clubs. Sponsorship & Commercial agreements are the way to 
clubs differentiate in the future, as broadcast are relatively equal and matchday 
is restricted to stadium capacity, supported by on-pitch performance and 
trophies.  
 
Organization of professional football  
Football is a global game and the football industry can be analyzed as a 
worldwide industry. FIFA was the main responsible for the expansion of the 
football all over the world. This association was founded at the start of the 20th 
century, in 1904, with the principal objective of unify the laws of the football game 
to make it fair for all. Global football is organized into six confederations, which 
are recognized by FIFA, to know: AFConf, CAF, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, OFC 
and UEFA, with all of them having affiliated associations as representative of 
FIFA in each country, performing a total of 211 associations. (Figure16) 
Professional football competitions can be divided into 3 different types: national 
team competitions, international club competitions and national club 
competitions. 
 
Mix of 3 Ratings– Sportive Peer Group 
Since Arsenal is a European football Club based in UK, can compete for UEFA 
International Club competitions named UEFA Champions League, the most 
recognized football tournament, or for UEFA Europa League, the second level of 
UEFA International club competitions. Can also compete for UK competitions as 
Premier League, FA Cup, League Cup or FA Community Shield. Peer group 
should be a bunch of companies operating in similar business activities, affected 
by the same factors. Arsenal should be compared with European Clubs, who are 
influenced by European GDP and UEFA payments. 
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Table 6: UEFA Club coefficient top 25 & 
listed clubs 
Source: UEFA; Bloomberg & AS computation  
UEFA has developed a European club ranking based on the results achieved on 
UEFA competitions during previous seasons. Top 10 at the begin of 2018/19 
season and based on the last 5 seasons is disclosed in Table 3. KPMG has 
ranked the clubs according to EV based on different factors like profitability, 
popularity, sportive potential or stadium ownership. 
According to KPMG and based on the data at the end of 2017/18 season, 
Manchester United, Liverpool FC, Chelsea as well as Tottenham deserve a place 
at top ten (Table 4). To support these rank, total operating revenue from football 
activities was investigated. Top10 according to this criterion was fully complete 
by clubs between the other two methods (Table 5). The final list of sportive peers 
was composed by fourteen clubs, the European top ones (Table 6). These clubs 
are trying to transform their business, a natural entertainment companies, into 
global brands, fighting not also for prestigious trophies but also to attract fans, 
customers and audiences on a worldwide level. 
 
Domination of European Football 
Champions League winner during last 10 seasons was 9 times one of these 14 
clubs, the only exception was in 2009/10 when Inter managed by José Mourinho 
beat Bayern Munich by 2-0. At National championship level, the League title was 
won 75% times by these teams, with Juventus, Bayern and Barcelona 
conquering 7 in 10 possible (Appendix 4). 
 
All these clubs have stadium, which is a very important assets for clubs, giving 
the possibility of generating higher levels of revenues by different sources rather 
than just by hosting the club football games. With a stadium ownership, clubs can 
host a lot of different events like NFL games or music concerts, sell the naming 
rights or even develop different and innovative features to incentive tourists and 
locals to visit the stadium. This will enable the clubs to generate additional 
revenues with the stadium even in a non-matchday. 
 
Top 10 by revenues generated  £5,073.75m in operating revenues in 2018, an 
average increase of 6.81% YoY, being that commercial and broadcast revenues 
are the ones with the highest percentage with 44% and 38% of the total 
amount, furthermore the average match attendance was over 57 thousands 
which generated the remaining 18% of operating revenue (Figure 17). Between 
these ten clubs, Real Madrid was the one with highest revenues, £664m. 
During 2017/18 season these clubs were responsible for almost 23% of the total 
operating revenue generated by European clubs, which was £25b.  
 
5. Investment Summary 
Based on the valuation methods performed, I consider that the price paid by KSE 
UK Inc of £29,419.64 per share was 0.6% below my target price, £29,582.24. 
Popularity uptrend of the football industry, followed by new broadcast contracts 
of EPL as well as UEFA competitions, new closed sponsorship contracts and the 
ingoing liquidation of the Stadium financing debt are some of the reasons that 
support my valuation. 
 
To perform AFC target price at the acquisition date I computed the FCFF method, 
discounting the cash flows through WACC rate. Enterprise Value was calculated 
as a whole, because it is expected that just the football business unit will continue 
to have ingoing operations. In order to get an alternative valuation that could 
reinforce/confirm the main method, multiples valuation was also performed, with 
the results suggesting a higher valuation than DCF, with a target price of 
£32,801.51 per share. To select comparable companies, I decided to use UEFA 
club´s ranking, related to sporting performance, and Bloomberg terminal to get 
financial data. 
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Figure 18: AFC PL broadcasting revenues  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
FY
2017
FY
2018
2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
PL Broadcasting value Arsenal %
Source: AFC & AS computation 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
European Broadcasting value Arsenal %
Figure 19: AFC UEFA broadcasting revenues 
Source: AFC & AS computation 
Source: AFC & AS computation 
Table 7: AFC Sponsor deals 
Football Industry has risks, and both clubs and investors should be prepared and 
aware for the possible impact that some external factors could have on the 
company sustainability. Some variables and assumptions of the discounted cash 
flow model were stressed in order to understand how they could affect the target 
price. The risks for the club were also analyzed.  
6. Valuation  
Two valuation methods were used based on different valuation approaches: 
relative valuation with comparable multiples and absolute valuation with 
Discounted Cash Flow by FCFF. Arsenal have not paid dividends and so DDM 
was not taken into consideration. 
 
Absolute Valuation – DCF Method 
To perform the DCF Method some assumptions were done regarding the 
components of the Financial Statements. The forecast was done for a time frame 
of five years and with a final Terminal Value, which accounts for the major part 
of the company valuation by assuming a perpetuity for the club operations. 
  
Revenue: To forecast Arsenal revenues, I followed what Arsenal have done in 
previous Income Statements reports, by splitting them into two business units: 
Football and Property Development. Football area is composed by four different 
sources of revenue while Property Development is related with real estate 
activities associated with the stadium construction. 
Football business unit 
Broadcasting: Total Broadcasting Revenues includes PL and UEFA revenues. 
PL Broadcasting Revenues were forecasted based on an average of last 4 years 
ratio of arsenal revenue for total PL distributions among the clubs. This payment 
value is based on factors explained before. The value of the total payment is 
already disclosed for 2019 (present broadcast cycle) but also for the new cycle 
which starts in 2020 and for a period of three years. In 2023 I applied an increase 
of 8% based on last cycle upgrade. An adjustment of 0.88% YoY was done during 
each year of the cycles to reflect variations of new deals agreements as seen 
during last cycle (Figure 18). UEFA payments follow the same rational of looking 
to past receipts as a percentage of the total payment distribution to clubs, but in 
this case depending on the competition: UCL or UEL. It is assumed that Arsenal 
will play in UCL in all the forecasted periods except for the next season (2018/19) 
where they couldn’t get a qualification. This assumption was done based on 
Arsenal historical European performance. The new broadcast cycle starts next 
season and the value of the total distribution is public. To forecast the new 
contract value, I used an average of the uplift observed on the renegotiation of 
the last two cycles (50.18%). An adjustment of 2.5% YoY during each cycle was 
done (Figure 19). 
Commercial and Retail: Commercial and Retail Revenues are agglomerated as 
it was done in the last Arsenal official report (2018). Arsenal Sponsorship 
contracts will suffer an upgrade in 2019 due to an addition of sleeve sponsor, but 
mainly in 2020 with the end of some contracts and the value of the new ones. 
Adidas will substitute Puma and Emirates will increase the payment to be the 
shirt sponsor. All these changes were accounted, with the addition of the 
assumption that all the remaining revenues increase 1.2% YoY based on retail 
and some new small local agreements (Table 7). 
Gate and Other Match Day Revenues: This portion of Revenues is dependent on 
the stadium capacity. Arsenal have a record of 99% occupancy rate during last 
3 seasons and it is expected to continue.  An average of the last 5years was done 
and used as forecast. 
Player Trading: The value receipt with Arsenal players loans is a small part of  
total revenue (around 1%), and it is not used as a source to obtain revenues  
but as a way to control wage cost by loaning surplus players. The average of last 
five years was applied as future forecasts. 
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Table 8: DCF Analysis 
Property Development Area 
Due to the construction of the new stadium in 2007, Arsenal has been using the 
properties of the old stadium as a source of revenue. Nearly all the properties 
were sold with just one remaining as a stock. I assumed the same cost and profit 
margins as the ones observed on the last property sale, in 2018. After this sale, 
no more revenues will be recorded by this source as no more properties will be 
available. 
Staff cost: Staff costs are the largest cost within the industry. Historical average 
of Arsenal staff costs was equal to 53.7% of total revenues. This relationship was 
used as staff costs forecast. 
Total depreciation, amortization and impairment: Depreciations are 
applicated to tangible fixed assets, which include the Emirates Stadium and all 
the remaining PP&E. As AFC report does not disclose detailed information about 
each asset net value, I utilized accumulated depreciation to get the depreciation 
of the period. It was assumed that depreciation shall follow the same CAGR 
recorded in the last 5 years (8.95%), based on the “disinvestment” in installations. 
Amortizations affect intangible fixed assets, mainly composed by PR. The 
amortization of PR is a stable percentage of total cost of player registrations and 
so it was assumed the average of the last five years of 17.11% for the forecasted 
period. Goodwill is no longer amortized, and his value is assumed to not increase 
in the future. Impairment of player registrations are related to players who 
suffered a career threatening, which are quite uncommon. In the last five years it 
was recorded values in this rubric just twice, the average of these years was used 
as the forecast value (Figure 20). 
Disposal and acquisition of player registrations: The relation between 
acquisitions and disposal of PR was assumed to be 1.54 based on peers’ transfer 
activity of the last three years (Appendix 6). The acquisition of player registrations 
was defined as 33.69% of total revenue following the average of last 4 years 
without 2016, as it was considered an outlier. Transfers revenue was calculated 
through the money spent in transfer divided by the transfer multiple. The value of 
the sold players was assumed to be 83.77% liquidate according to last year 
records. Total transfers income can be found by subtracting the net value to total 
transfers revenue. 
 
Cost of Capital – WACC Assumptions 
 Weight Average Cost of Capital was used as discount rate based on the after-
tax requirement rates of return of debt and equity, having into consideration the 
capital structure. 
Cost of Debt was calculated as the interest expense over the total debt for each 
year. AFC used financial instruments to fix interest rate of future debt payments, 
ranging from 5.82% to 5.85%. 
Cost of Equity follow CAPM based on some assumptions: Income Tax rate was 
considered to be 19% in 2019F and 17% in the remaining years according to 
AFC forecasts; RFR (Risk Free Rate) was established as the 10Y bond from UK, 
which reflect the Brexit context; From Damodaran database it was assumed the 
values of CRP (Country Risk Premium) at 0.69% and the value of UK MRP 
(Market Risk Premium) at 6.65%. Arsenal stocks were thinly traded, so the Pure-
Play beta Method was applied based on peer’s data from Bloomberg, and the 
final value of 0.241 was achieved for the unlevered beta (Appendix 8). The 
levered beta is calculated for each year by considering capital structure and tax 
rate differences. 
 
Terminal Value Assumptions 
AFC still shows high increases of revenues throw the years, with broadcast and 
commercial contracts reaching new highs every time that they are renegotiated, 
outperforming the economy pace. However, the mature phase of the industry, 
which include AFC and all the other peers, should be considered and so a 
conservative TV growth rate approach was applied by adjusting the theoretical 
TV growth rate of 2.89%, with a reduction of 100bps. (Appendix 8) 
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Table 9: EV/EBITDA Multiple 
valuation 
 
Relative Valuation – Comparable Multiples 
 
Comparable Multiples is an easy and useful instrument to complement Absolute 
Valuation Methods as DCF. With the aim to confirm the DCF valuation I did a 
cross check with the comparable multiples. Relative Valuation assumes that a 
company valuation can be achieved based on the value of comparable 
companies.  
Comparable multiples consist on the valuation of a company based on ratios 
(multiples) of similar (comparable) companies. Comparable companies are 
known as peers.  
Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiple was the selected to perform the relative 
valuation, as it has low sensitivity to effects of financial leverage/capital structure 
compared to price multiples. 
 
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦)
+  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
Peers are a vital piece to perform this method and so the process of selection 
should be carefully done to get the proper peer group. To pick Arsenal’s peer 
group an alternative approach was used to obtain the most similar companies. 
The resulting peer group reached was composed by seven firms from five 
different countries. Olympique Lyonnais Groupe SA, Sport Lisboa e Benfica-
Futebol SAD ,Futebol clube do Porto, Juventus Football Club SpA, Borussia 
Dortmund GmbH & Co KgaA, AS Roma SpA and Manchester United Plc were 
the final peer group. (Appendix 5; Table 6) 
Based on data extracted from Bloomberg, a four years analysis was done. A 
weighted average was applied giving more importance to Manchester United 
data (66.66%) based on similarity of economic factors with Arsenal.  
The final valuation of £32,801.51 per share was reached, indicating a discount in 
the price paid of 11.5% (Appendix 10; Table 9). The Multiples valuation suggests 
a higher value than DCF valuation. The percentage of 66.66% attributed to 
Manchester United can biased the final valuation as it is the 3rd in the Operating 
Revenues ranking (Table 5), 1.54 times Arsenal Revenues and also a lower staff 
costs to revenues ratio (0.48 instead of 0.55). 
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  
AFC financial performance was evaluated by looking at historical and forecasted 
values, highlighting some KPIs illustrated by profitability, liquidity and solvency 
ratios (Appendix 3). 
 
New era of broadcast and sponsor contracts - new achievements  
Arsenal revenues increased from £301.87m to £403.27 since 2014 till 2018, an 
average YoY increase of 7.51%. This uplift can be justified based on new 
sponsorship contracts with 8.50% average YoY increase, but also due to new 
cycles of broadcast contracts which are renegotiated with huge increases with 
an average YoY increase of 10.51%. Gate & Other Match Day Revenues were 
relatively stable with an average YoY decrease of -0.33%. Revenues just 
recorded decreases in absolute values in 2018. This decrease was due to the fail 
in participate on UCL, decreasing the broadcast revenue in 9.33% or 35.5% when 
looking separately for UEFA broadcasting revenues. In the future the Revenues 
are expected to outpace the historical growth, with new sponsor deals and 
broadcast contracts justifying the average YoY increase of 9.74% and 11.71% 
respectively, driving the Revenues to 7.77% CAGR during 2018-23. 
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Figure 22: AFC EBIT vs EBITPT 
Source: AFC & AS computation 
Major operating cost, staff costs, will keep following revenues pace  
Staff costs were the major contributor of expenses during the past, with an 
average percentage of 53%. The increase of revenues lead clubs to invest in 
human resources to keep a competitive Football team. During 2014 to 2018 this 
operating expense suffer an average YoY increase of 7.58% which was very 
similar to Revenues increase. This correlation is expected to continue in the 
future with the staff costs following the Revenues tendency, with an YoY average 
increase of 7.15% (Figure 21) 
 
EBIT vs EBITPT 
Operating profit should be analyzed before and after player transactions as the 
clubs should be profitable without them as these operations are uncertain, volatile 
and in the case of AFC is not the core/crucial source of revenues. AFC has 
always recorded positive EBIT, increasing by 45.37% CAGR from 2014-18 to 
78.98m. EBITPT is tendentially bigger than EBIT as the club sped more than gain 
in PT. Arsenal operating income is not dependent on player sales as the club 
adjust his purchases with the sales. The board of directors have expressed their 
desired to invest in the team to be even more competitive and is expected that 
this investment will increase soon but without putting in cause the financial 
sustainability of the club. Net book value of PRs are expected to record an CAGR 
of 13.80% from 2018-23F, climbing from 23.15% to 31.43% of Total Assets 
(Figure 22)  
 
Liquidity 
Current Ratio and Quick ratio have recorded values above 1 and it is expected 
to increase even more to 1.70 and 1.42 in 2023F, meaning that the club will be 
able to cover its short-term debt with its current assets. By looking at the cash 
flow statement it is easily observed that the company was generating cash in a 
sustainable way, with positive cash flows, and the forecast period follows the 
same path. (Table 10) 
 
Profitability 
The club has been able to generate positive net income in the past and I have 
predicted the same path for the future with an overall uplift of 36.57% from 2018-
23F, increasing from £56,554m to £77,24m. Profitability ratios for 2023F are 
lower than 2018 values despite 6.4% CAGR for net income. The abnormal net 
income in 2018, justified by higher revenues than costs in PT can explained this 
decrease, as well as the higher CAGR of assets (7.05%) and equity (12.47%) 
(Table 11) 
 
No more debt to finance CapEx in the near future 
AFC assets enlarged over the last years due to the investment on PR, recorded 
as Intangible assets. The club has already constructed the stadium and the 
training camp, so is not expected to invest huge amounts in infrastructures in a 
near future. The players will be the responsible for the continually increase of the 
assets, with an expected average YoY of 7% for 2018-23F, or 13.8% by isolating 
PR. As AFC CapEx main items were the stadium and the training center, which 
needed to be financed by debt, now the club focused his investments in 
acquisitions of PR. Since this investment is dependent on revenues, the club 
does not need to contract more debt. In 2018FY the company recorded a 
negative net debt, and the difference between debt and cash will be bigger and 
bigger in the next few years (Figure 23). 
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8. Investment Risks 
There are some risks that could potentially affect the company performance 
throughout the years. Risks were segmented into three main categories: 
Financial Risk (FR), Operational Risk (OR), Regulatory Risk (RR). 
 
Financial Risk │ Credit risk (FR1) 
Credit risk refers to the risk that a counterparty will not pay its obligations, being 
that the group will not recover the value of the sold assets at the agreed timeline. 
This risk arises from transfer activity or any other agreements with sponsors or 
for broadcast rights. The risk could be minimized by asking for instalments, 
advance payments or even a guarantee from the bank, being that the club should 
do a regular monitorisation with a creation of a reserve for uncertain accounts 
receivable.  
Financial Risk │ Liquidity risk (FR2) 
Liquidity risk concerns the risk of the group could not has access to funds to meet 
its payment obligations at the maturity date, being that available cash flow could 
not be enough. To guarantee appropriate levels of funds, the club forecast the 
cash flow on a continuous basis considering the debt resulted of the stadium 
construction, ensuring the normal operation of the business with the required 
debt service reserves. AFC has more than 20% of assets in cash, turning liquidity 
ratios favourable with values over one. 
Financial Risk │ Exchange rate fluctuations (FR3) 
PL clubs can be exposed to exchange rate fluctuations through two sources: 
UEFA payments due to UCL or UEL participation; Player transactions with 
foreign clubs. Arsenal hedge his foreign exchange exposure by using derivative 
financial instruments.  
Financial Risk │ Change in interest rates (FR4) 
Football clubs with outstanding debt finance that are subject to floating rates that 
could sudden change and have an impact on the club financial results, normally 
enter into interest rate swaps to fix the rate and eliminate the interest rate risk 
such as Arsenal does.  
Financial Risk │ Economic downturn (FR5) 
Although multiyear contracts are present in the industry, an economic downturn 
in Europe or UK could affect revenues relative to personal disposable income 
like Matchday revenues. Broadcasting and Sponsorship revenues could also be 
affected if the companies affiliated to us suffer an economic impact and need to 
cut costs. 
 
Operational Risk │ UCL Qualification (OR1) 
Qualification for UCL is an important achievement for the clubs as it implies a 
relevant part of revenues but also increase the prestige of them. The qualification 
depends on internal factors like last season performance in the PL or even in 
UEFA competitions but also on external factors such as the total places for each 
national football association for the UEFA competition which is based on a 
ranking that can vary. If a club doesn’t qualify for UCL could see its ability to 
acquire or retain key players affected, as well as the interest of sponsors and 
supporters. To minimize this risk the clubs should include on the contract of 
player a clause related to the remuneration if the team fail to qualify for the group 
stage of the competition, which permit the club to adjust staff costs to the reduce 
of revenues. 
Operational Risk │ Players physical health (OR2) 
Injuries can force players to stop play for a long period or even to end up early 
the football career. As an asset of the club, if a player suffers an injury that forces 
him to stop play, the club would not make profit with a possible transfer or get the 
aimed sport returns. To mitigate this risk the clubs should have a nice medical 
department and a competitive team with players able to substitute the injured 
teammates. 
Operational Risk │ Recruitment and retention of key employees (OR3) 
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Attract and maintain high-quality employees including managers, players or 
executives is crucial to achieve success inside and outside the pitch. The rivalry 
between clubs can lead clubs to incur in high salary expenses in order to attract 
top players, with the ones with higher revenues having also greater spending 
capacity. Transfer campaign is the way to control and manage the squad 
constitution, controlling also the wage costs. Any fail to acquire a key player or to 
sell an actual player can lead the club to unexpected costs or unsuccess 
seasons. 
Operational Risk │ Negotiation of broadcast contracts (OR4) 
Negotiation of broadcasting contracts are done by Premier League and UEFA on 
a centralized basis. The established final price and its distribution during the 
3year cycle affect the clubs and they don’t have any direct influence alone on the 
outcome of the deal. Although the broadcast revenue is centralized and fix, there 
are always an additional variable value due to sporting performance. The 
duration of 3 years seems to be a way to mitigate the short-term risk. 
Operational Risk │ Key sponsor agreements (OR5) 
Sponsor deals are not permanent, and clubs should be aware that sponsor could 
not be interested in renewing the partnership. Change of interest from sponsors, 
reducing the investments, or difficult to find new sponsors with similar deal values 
could affect clubs' financial position with revenues recording an unexpected 
growth. Became a global club to attract sponsors worldwide, as well as close 
multiple-year contracts with large maturity dates can guarantee this source of 
revenue in the short-term, reducing this risk. 
Operational Risk │ Football popularity (OR6) 
Football is the most popular sport in UK, entitled the national game. All this 
popularity helps the industry to increase revenues in all the key drivers, mainly 
broadcasting. A decline in football popularity could lead to a decrease of 
matchday, broadcasting or sponsorship revenues since there could be fewer 
people interested. 
Operational Risk │ Unexpected catastrophic events (OR7)   
Companies within the industry can be affected by natural disasters, wars, terrorist 
acts or some incident like the airplane fall of the team which are out of clubs 
control. Although the European clubs' operations are in peaceful countries, 
players need to travel for promotional matches or to represent their national team 
in countries with a recent war history. Clubs should insure against any of these 
potential events with insurance policies, protecting their most valuable assets 
which are in the case of Arsenal, the Players, Emirates stadium and the training 
facilities. 
 
Regulatory Risk │ Financial Fair Play (RR1) 
Arsenal is subject to Company Law, F.A, Premier League, UEFA and FIFA rules 
concerning club finances, accounting and good governance. The Premier 
League has implemented financial rules regarding the payment of transfer fees, 
tax bills or wages at time or even loss limits to Earnings before taxes, being 
obligated to submit accounts on an annual basis. The applicable sanctions 
include fines, deduction of points in the premier League or transfers restrictions. 
To be illegible to participate in European championships clubs should satisfy 
sporting, infrastructure, personal and administrative, legal and also financial 
standards, obtaining the UEFA License, created in 2004, that is also constituted 
by the FFP. In September 2009 UEFA's Executive Committee created the FFP 
in order to promote an improvement of clubs’ financial conditions, increasing the 
credibility and transparency of them with the aim of ensure sustainability in the 
long-term for European football. Among the measures, break-even rule deserves 
a highlight. The acceptable deviation for the break-even is 5m euros or up to 30m 
euros if equity holders guaranteed funds to cover the difference. The break-even 
point should be calculated just with relevant costs without considering Capex in 
training facilities, stadiums, women´s football and also youth developments. If the 
relevant costs exceed revenues, considering a cumulative value over three 
years, clubs can also be subject to UEFA sanctions. UEFA CFCB disciplinary 
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Source: AS computation 
Source: AS computation 
Source: AS computation 
Table 12: sensitivity analysis 1 
Table 13: sensitivity analysis 2 
Table 14: sensitivity analysis 3 
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measures can vary depending on the situation and could be: warning; reprimand;  
fine; deduction of points; withholding of revenues from a UEFA competition; 
prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions; restriction on the 
number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA competitions, 
including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the employee benefits 
expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purposes of UEFA club 
competitions; disqualification from competitions in progress and/or exclusion 
from future competitions; withdrawal of a title or award. 
Regulatory Risk │ Legal and Regulatory (RR2) 
The clubs are regulated by the rules of FIFA, UEFA and also by the country 
league rules so any change in these regulations can affect the clubs because the 
regulations cover different areas of the club's environment such like competitions 
format, prizes, division of broadcast income or the transfers rules. 
 
Risks to Price Target  
DCF model requires independent variables to be done and AFC final valuation is 
sensitive to the selected assumptions. In order to understand how the target price 
is affected by changes in different variables, I have performed isolated analysis 
and multi-variable changes analysis with Monte Carlo Simulation. 
 
Three variables were picked to be stressed ceteris paribus, all of them in the TV: 
Terminal growth rate, RFR, Unlevered Beta (Appendix 11). 
Terminal growth rate was adjusted to be in line with the forecasted UK GDP in 
2023F. AFC target price is very sensitive to changes in this variable, since AFC 
has outperformed UK GDP during the years, assuming a lower value to this input 
would lead to a target price below the acquisition price (Table 12). Risk free rate 
was assumed to be 2% in TV, 153 basis points above UK 10Y bonds (table13). 
Higher RFR would decrease target price. Assumptions regarding peer’s selection 
influence beta value. Lower betas would boost price target (Table 14).  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
With the intention of stress more than one variable at the same time Monte Carlo 
Simulation was performed, by using Crystal Ball Software. I decided to do it twice. 
Firstly I selected terminal WACC, terminal g and the ratio between expenditures 
in PR and income in PR. Secondly I decided to split WACC rate into two inputs: 
unlevered beta and RFR and still stressed the other two variables. The mean 
was £31,291.82 in the first simulation and £30,236.25 in the second one. These 
simulations were in line with the target price. The probability of the share price 
be higher than the acquisition value was 63.08% and 67.14%. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Financial Reports 
 
 
AFC BALANCE SHEET  FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 18-23F 
CURRENT ASSETS 293.17 323.27 304.81 265.64 359.81 414.09 451.65 495.00 552.30 613.26 11.25% 
Cash and cash equivalents 207.88 228.17 226.46 180.12 231.34 301.81 331.78 374.37 426.03 483.64 15.89% 
Inventories 14.78 14.27 15.98 19.66 13.69 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.43 -16.88% 
Stock-retail merchandise 4.94 4.53 4.83 7.36 5.50 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.43 -0.25% 
Stock - development properties  9.85 9.74 11.15 12.30 8.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
Trade Debtors or Trade Accounts Receivable 33.42 25.56 28.90 27.55 35.39 30.16 30.16 30.16 30.16 30.16 -3.15% 
Prepayment and accrued income 24.86 35.99 23.96 30.97 15.86 26.33 26.33 26.33 26.33 26.33 10.67% 
Other debtors - related to players transfers 12.23 19.29 9.51 7.36 63.53 50.36 57.95 58.72 64.35 67.70 1.28% 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 541.46 596.09 572.71 618.70 669.25 702.34 743.44 774.29 806.50 833.22 4.48% 
Property, Plant & Equip, Net  421.40 419.18 421.06 430.97 424.81 416.81 407.29 396.05 382.92 367.69 -2.85% 
LT Investments & Receivables 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n/a 
Goodwill 1.50 1.08 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n/a 
Other Intangible Assets (net book value of PR) 114.99 171.66 146.01 182.03 238.25 278.39 328.08 369.22 413.62 454.64 13.80% 
Investments in Affiliates 3.57 4.17 4.98 5.44 6.19 7.13 8.07 9.01 9.95 10.89 11.95% 
TOTAL ASSETS 834.62 919.37 877.51 884.34 1,029.06 1,116.43 1,195.09 1,269.29 1,358.80 1,446.48 7.05% 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 203.03 273.73 239.95 213.81 245.92 318.82 316.49 330.96 344.32 361.06 7.98% 
Accounts Payable  11.40 7.62 10.77 8.90 9.91 9.72 9.72 9.72 9.72 9.72 -0.39% 
Accrued Taxes  21.39 24.94 22.91 27.81 34.83 39.34 44.44 50.20 56.71 64.06 12.96% 
Accruals and deferred income 132.56 173.27 156.47 132.32 142.58 147.44 147.44 147.44 147.44 147.44 0.67% 
Other creditors 30.98 57.80 41.82 36.76 50.09 113.29 105.31 113.43 119.66 128.39 20.71% 
ST Debt- Fixed rate bonds-secured 6.70 7.12 7.56 8.02 8.50 9.02 9.58 10.16 10.79 11.45 6.13% 
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES 320.97 314.96 309.51 307.17 363.23 335.91 337.38 328.75 326.30 320.00 -2.50% 
Fixed rate bonds-secured 153.35 146.10 138.40 130.25 121.61 112.58 103.00 92.84 82.05 70.60 -10.30% 
Floating rate bonds 52.57 52.43 48.04 48.18 48.31 48.45 48.59 48.72 48.86 49.00 0.28% 
Debenture loans 27.83 28.21 14.20 14.60 15.01 15.41 15.83 16.24 16.67 17.10 2.64% 
Deferred income 13.07 1.01 17.83 17.63 34.16 34.16 34.16 34.16 34.16 34.16 0.00% 
Derivatives & Hedging 0.00 0.00 24.41 26.43 23.15 23.15 23.15 23.15 23.15 23.15 0.00% 
Grants 3.80 3.71 3.62 3.53 3.44 3.35 3.26 3.17 3.08 2.99 -2.77% 
Other creditors 15.87 32.92 18.97 23.56 64.32 48.97 56.34 57.09 62.57 65.82 0.46% 
Provisions for Liabilities 54.49 50.60 44.05 43.00 53.23 49.85 53.06 53.38 55.77 57.18 1.44% 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 524.00 588.70 549.45 520.97 609.14 654.73 653.87 659.71 670.62 681.06 2.26% 
Share Capital & APIC 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 30.06 0.00% 
Common Stock  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00% 
Additional Paid in Capital 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 0.00% 
Retained Earnings  253.86 273.91 271.30 306.61 363.16 404.95 484.47 552.82 631.43 708.67 14.31% 
Other Equity 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 26.70 0.00% 
TOTAL EQUITY 310.62 330.67 328.06 363.37 419.92 461.70 541.23 609.58 688.19 765.43 12.76% 
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 834.62 919.37 877.51 884.34 1,029.06 1,116.43 1,195.10 1,269.29 1,358.81 1,446.49 7.05% 
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AFC INCOME STATEMENT FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 18-23F 
Revenue 301.87 344.52 353.54 423.96 403.27 436.06 501.73 508.38 557.18 586.15 7.77% 
  Football 298.66 329.34 350.62 422.80 388.23 406.07 501.73 508.38 557.18 586.15 8.59% 
    Broadcasting 120.76 124.84 140.58 198.64 180.10 185.27 239.56 244.36 286.29 313.31 11.71% 
Premier League 0.00 96.50 100.95 139.64 142.04 145.63 157.28 158.66 160.06 172.86 4.01% 
Uefa Competitions 0.00 28.34 39.63 59.00 38.06 39.63 82.28 85.70 126.23 140.45 29.84% 
Commercial & Retail 77.15 103.29 106.91 117.23 106.92 118.16 159.53 161.37 168.24 170.19 9.74% 
Gate & Other Match Day Revenues 100.23 100.40 99.91 100.00 98.91 99.89 99.89 99.89 99.89 99.89 0.20% 
Player Trading 0.51 0.81 3.23 6.93 2.31 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 3.60% 
Property Development 3.21 15.19 2.92 1.16 15.04 29.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
Operating Expenses              
Total depreciation, amortization and impairment 52.92 70.40 73.93 92.51 107.76 108.36 120.44 132.83 146.43 160.84 8.34% 
Amortisation of goodwill 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
Amortisation of player registrations 40.07 54.43 59.26 77.13 85.81 91.23 101.67 112.25 123.84 136.04 9.65% 
Impairment of player registrations 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 5.95 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 -25.37% 
Depreciation and imparment charges 12.42 14.62 14.26 14.97 15.75 15.75 17.39 19.21 21.21 23.42 8.26% 
Staff costs (without exceptional costs) 166.40 192.26 195.39 199.40 222.91 234.16 269.43 273.00 299.21 314.76 7.15% 
Exceptional costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
Cost of property sales 2.70 2.04 0.82 0.63 9.42 18.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
Other operating charges 69.79 72.11 70.21 79.44 88.04 93.31 98.89 104.81 111.08 117.72 5.98% 
Total Operating expenses 291.81 336.81 340.35 371.97 445.28 454.61 488.76 510.64 556.71 593.32 5.91% 
Operating Profit before player transactions 10.06 7.71 13.19 51.99 -42.01 -18.55 12.97 -2.26 0.47 -7.17 -29.78% 
Profit on Disposal of players registrations 6.91 28.94 2.05 6.76 120.05 95.16 109.50 110.95 121.60 127.92 1.28% 
Share of joint venture operating results 0.71 0.76 1.00 0.60 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.00% 
Operating Profit / EBIT 17.69 37.42 16.24 59.34 78.98 63.40 107.12 93.13 104.92 102.66 5.39% 
Net finance charges 13.02 12.75 13.37 14.74 8.76 11.81 11.31 10.78 10.21 9.60 1.85% 
Bank loans and overdrafts 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 35.10% 
Fixed/floating rate bonds 12.76 12.36 12.22 11.74 11.26 10.88 10.37 9.84 9.27 8.67 -5.09% 
Costs of raising long term finance 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.38% 
Interest receivable 0.89 -0.83 -0.79 -0.37 -0.45 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -7.15% 
Change in fair value of financial instruments 0.00 0.00 0.68 2.02 -3.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00% 
EBT 4.67 24.67 2.87 44.61 70.21 51.58 95.81 82.35 94.71 93.06 5.79% 
Uk tax on profit 0.00 0.00 0.57 8.85 13.34 9.80 16.29 14.00 16.10 15.82 3.47% 
Total tax (charge)/credit for the year 2.60 -4.67 -1.22 -9.32 -13.66 -9.80 -16.29 -14.00 -16.10 -15.82 2.98% 
NET PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 7.27 20.00 1.65 35.29 56.55 41.78 79.52 68.35 78.61 77.24 6.43% 
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AFC Cash Flow Statement FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 60.87 100.19 85.51 101.28 111.30 88.72 125.34 122.57 139.60 146.52 
Operating profit/(loss) 10.06 7.71 13.19 51.99 -42.01 -18.55 12.97 -2.26 0.47 -7.17 
Amortisation of player registrations 40.07 54.43 59.26 77.13 85.81 91.23 101.67 112.25 123.84 136.04 
Impairment of player registrations 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 5.95 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Amortisation ofgoodwill 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Profit on disposal of tangible assets 0.00 0.27 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Depreciation  12.42 14.62 14.26 14.97 15.75 15.75 17.39 19.21 21.21 23.42 
Provisions       -3.39 3.21 0.32 2.38 1.42 
Operating cash flow before working capital 62.98 78.39 87.05 144.48 65.74 86.33 136.53 130.81 149.19 154.99 
NWC             
Decrease/(increase) in stock 0.33 0.51 -1.71 -3.68 5.96 8.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Decrease/(increase) in debtors 0.00 -4.98 9.71 -5.04 7.93 -5.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Increase/(decrease) in creditors 0.00 28.48 -1.20 -26.73 43.65 9.18 5.10 5.76 6.51 7.35 
Taxation paid -2.45 -2.21 -8.33 -7.76 -11.98 -9.80 -16.29 -14.00 -16.10 -15.82 
CASH FLOW FROM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES 0.00 -59.63 -66.93 -127.29 -39.87 1.82 -75.27 -59.88 -67.81 -68.78 
Interest received 0.00 0.86 0.75 0.48 0.40 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Proceeds from sale of fixed assets 0.00 0.05 0.75 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Purchase of fixed assets 0.00 -14.30 -14.23 -25.26 -11.64 -7.76 -7.87 -7.97 -8.08 -8.19 
Player registrations * -11.12 -46.24 -54.19 -102.52 -28.65 9.28 -67.72 -52.22 -60.04 -60.90 
Payment for purchase of players 0.00 -71.70 -66.83 -111.46 -109.76 -99.06 -169.63 -162.40 -176.00 -185.48 
Receipts from sale of players 0.00 25.46 12.64 8.94 81.11 108.33 101.91 110.18 115.96 124.57 
CASH FLOW FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 0.00 -20.27 -20.29 -20.34 -20.20 -20.08 -20.09 -20.11 -20.12 -20.13 
Interest paid 0.00 -12.99 -12.62 -12.25 -11.68 -12.12 -11.62 -11.08 -10.52 -9.91 
Repayment of debt 0.00 -7.27 -7.67 -8.08 -8.52 -7.96 -8.48 -9.02 -9.60 -10.22 
INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 54.42 20.29 -1.71 -46.34 51.23 70.47 29.97 42.58 51.67 57.60 
Cash and cash equivalents at start of year 153.46 207.88 228.17 226.46 180.12 231.34 301.81 331.78 374.37 426.03 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 207.88 228.17 226.46 180.12 231.34 301.81 331.78 374.37 426.03 483.64 
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Appendix 2: FR Commom size 
Balance Sheet as a percentage of Total Assets 
 
 
AFC BALANCE SHEET  FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CURRENT ASSETS 35.13% 35.16% 34.74% 30.04% 34.97% 37.09% 37.79% 39.00% 40.65% 42.40% 
Cash and cash equivalents 24.91% 24.82% 25.81% 20.37% 22.48% 27.03% 27.76% 29.49% 31.35% 33.44% 
Inventories 1.77% 1.55% 1.82% 2.22% 1.33% 0.49% 0.45% 0.43% 0.40% 0.38% 
Stock-retail merchandise 0.59% 0.49% 0.55% 0.83% 0.53% 0.49% 0.45% 0.43% 0.40% 0.38% 
Stock - development properties  1.18% 1.06% 1.27% 1.39% 0.80% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Trade Debtors or Trade Accounts Receivable 4.00% 2.78% 3.29% 3.12% 3.44% 2.70% 2.52% 2.38% 2.22% 2.09% 
Prepayment and accrued income 2.98% 3.91% 2.73% 3.50% 1.54% 2.36% 2.20% 2.07% 1.94% 1.82% 
Other debtors - related to players transfers 1.47% 2.10% 1.08% 0.83% 6.17% 4.51% 4.85% 4.63% 4.74% 4.68% 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 64.87% 64.84% 65.26% 69.96% 65.03% 62.91% 62.21% 61.00% 59.35% 57.60% 
Property, Plant & Equip, Net  50.49% 45.59% 47.98% 48.73% 41.28% 37.33% 34.08% 31.20% 28.18% 25.42% 
LT Investments & Receivables 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Goodwill 0.18% 0.12% 0.08% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other Intangible Assets (net book value of PR) 13.78% 18.67% 16.64% 20.58% 23.15% 24.94% 27.45% 29.09% 30.44% 31.43% 
Investments in Affiliates 0.43% 0.45% 0.57% 0.62% 0.60% 0.64% 0.68% 0.71% 0.73% 0.75% 
TOTAL ASSETS 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 24.33% 29.77% 27.34% 24.18% 23.90% 28.56% 26.48% 26.07% 25.34% 24.96% 
Accounts Payable  1.37% 0.83% 1.23% 1.01% 0.96% 0.87% 0.81% 0.77% 0.72% 0.67% 
Accrued Taxes  2.56% 2.71% 2.61% 3.14% 3.38% 3.52% 3.72% 3.96% 4.17% 4.43% 
Accruals and deferred income 15.88% 18.85% 17.83% 14.96% 13.86% 13.21% 12.34% 11.62% 10.85% 10.19% 
Other creditors 3.71% 6.29% 4.77% 4.16% 4.87% 10.15% 8.81% 8.94% 8.81% 8.88% 
ST Debt- Fixed rate bonds-secured 0.80% 0.77% 0.86% 0.91% 0.83% 0.81% 0.80% 0.80% 0.79% 0.79% 
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES 38.46% 34.26% 35.27% 34.73% 35.30% 30.09% 28.23% 25.90% 24.01% 22.12% 
Fixed rate bonds-secured 18.37% 15.89% 15.77% 14.73% 11.82% 10.08% 8.62% 7.31% 6.04% 4.88% 
Floating rate bonds 6.30% 5.70% 5.47% 5.45% 4.69% 4.34% 4.07% 3.84% 3.60% 3.39% 
Debenture loans 3.33% 3.07% 1.62% 1.65% 1.46% 1.38% 1.32% 1.28% 1.23% 1.18% 
Deferred income 1.57% 0.11% 2.03% 1.99% 3.32% 3.06% 2.86% 2.69% 2.51% 2.36% 
Derivatives & Hedging 0.00% 0.00% 2.78% 2.99% 2.25% 2.07% 1.94% 1.82% 1.70% 1.60% 
Grants 0.45% 0.40% 0.41% 0.40% 0.33% 0.30% 0.27% 0.25% 0.23% 0.21% 
Other creditors 1.90% 3.58% 2.16% 2.66% 6.25% 4.39% 4.71% 4.50% 4.60% 4.55% 
Provisions for Liabilities 6.53% 5.50% 5.02% 4.86% 5.17% 4.46% 4.44% 4.21% 4.10% 3.95% 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 62.78% 64.03% 62.61% 58.91% 59.19% 58.64% 54.71% 51.97% 49.35% 47.08% 
Share Capital & APIC 3.60% 3.27% 3.43% 3.40% 2.92% 2.69% 2.52% 2.37% 2.21% 2.08% 
Common Stock  0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Additional Paid in Capital 3.59% 3.26% 3.42% 3.39% 2.92% 2.69% 2.51% 2.36% 2.21% 2.07% 
Retained Earnings  30.42% 29.79% 30.92% 34.67% 35.29% 36.27% 40.54% 43.55% 46.47% 48.99% 
Other Equity 3.20% 2.90% 3.04% 3.02% 2.59% 2.39% 2.23% 2.10% 1.96% 1.85% 
TOTAL EQUITY 37.22% 35.97% 37.39% 41.09% 40.81% 41.36% 45.29% 48.03% 50.65% 52.92% 
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
  
 
 
21 
 
Income Statement as a percentage of Revenues 
 
 
AFC INCOME STATEMENT FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Revenue 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
  Football 98.94% 95.59% 99.18% 99.73% 96.27% 93.12% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
    Broadcasting 40.00% 36.24% 39.76% 46.85% 44.66% 42.49% 47.75% 48.07% 51.38% 53.45% 
Premier League 0.00% 28.01% 28.55% 32.94% 35.22% 33.40% 31.35% 31.21% 28.73% 29.49% 
Uefa Competitions 0.00% 8.23% 11.21% 13.92% 9.44% 9.09% 16.40% 16.86% 22.66% 23.96% 
Commercial & Retail 25.56% 29.98% 30.24% 27.65% 26.51% 27.10% 31.79% 31.74% 30.20% 29.04% 
Gate & Other Match Day Revenues 33.20% 29.14% 28.26% 23.59% 24.53% 22.91% 19.91% 19.65% 17.93% 17.04% 
Player Trading 0.17% 0.23% 0.91% 1.64% 0.57% 0.63% 0.55% 0.54% 0.50% 0.47% 
Property Development 1.06% 4.41% 0.82% 0.27% 3.73% 6.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Operating Expenses             
Total depreciation, amortization and impairment 17.53% 20.43% 20.91% 21.82% 26.72% 24.85% 24.00% 26.13% 26.28% 27.44% 
Amortisation of goodwill 0.14% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Amortisation of player registrations 13.27% 15.80% 16.76% 18.19% 21.28% 20.92% 20.26% 22.08% 22.23% 23.21% 
Impairment of player registrations 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 0.00% 1.47% 0.32% 0.27% 0.27% 0.25% 0.23% 
Depreciation and imparment charges 4.11% 4.24% 4.03% 3.53% 3.90% 3.61% 3.47% 3.78% 3.81% 4.00% 
Staff costs (without exceptional costs) 55.12% 55.80% 55.27% 47.03% 55.27% 53.70% 53.70% 53.70% 53.70% 53.70% 
Exceptional costs 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cost of property sales 0.90% 0.59% 0.23% 0.15% 2.34% 4.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other operating charges 23.12% 20.93% 19.86% 18.74% 21.83% 21.40% 19.71% 20.62% 19.94% 20.08% 
Total Operating expenses 96.67% 97.76% 96.27% 87.74% 110.42% 104.26% 97.42% 100.44% 99.92% 101.22% 
Operating Profit before player transactions 3.33% 2.24% 3.73% 12.26% -10.42% -4.26% 2.58% -0.44% 0.08% -1.22% 
Profit on Disposal of players registrations 2.29% 8.40% 0.58% 1.59% 29.77% 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 
Share of joint venture operating results 0.24% 0.22% 0.28% 0.14% 0.23% 0.22% 0.19% 0.18% 0.17% 0.16% 
Operating Profit / EBIT 5.86% 10.86% 4.59% 14.00% 19.58% 14.54% 21.35% 18.32% 18.83% 17.51% 
Net finance charges 4.31% 3.70% 3.78% 3.48% 2.17% 2.71% 2.25% 2.12% 1.83% 1.64% 
Bank loans and overdrafts 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Fixed/floating rate bonds 4.23% 3.59% 3.46% 2.77% 2.79% 2.49% 2.07% 1.94% 1.66% 1.48% 
Costs of raising long term finance 0.26% 0.24% 0.23% 0.19% 0.20% 0.19% 0.16% 0.16% 0.15% 0.14% 
Interest receivable 0.29% -0.24% -0.22% -0.09% -0.11% -0.07% -0.06% -0.06% -0.06% -0.05% 
Change in fair value of financial instruments 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.48% -0.81% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBT 1.55% 7.16% 0.81% 10.52% 17.41% 11.83% 19.10% 16.20% 17.00% 15.88% 
Uk tax on profit 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 2.09% 3.31% 2.25% 3.25% 2.75% 2.89% 2.70% 
Total tax (charge)/credit for the year 0.86% -1.36% -0.34% -2.20% -3.39% -2.25% -3.25% -2.75% -2.89% -2.70% 
NET PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 2.41% 5.80% 0.47% 8.32% 14.02% 9.58% 15.85% 13.44% 14.11% 13.18% 
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Cash Flow Statement as a percentage of CFO 
 
 
AFC Cash Flow Statement FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Operating profit/(loss) 16.53% 7.70% 15.42% 51.33% -37.74% -20.91% 10.35% -1.84% 0.33% -4.90% 
Amortisation of player registrations 65.83% 54.33% 69.30% 76.15% 77.10% 102.82% 81.11% 91.58% 88.72% 92.85% 
Impairment of player registrations 0.00% 0.93% 0.00% 0.00% 5.34% 1.55% 1.10% 1.12% 0.99% 0.94% 
Amortisation ofgoodwill 0.70% 0.42% 0.49% 0.41% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Profit on disposal of tangible assets 0.00% 0.27% -0.08% -0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Depreciation  20.40% 14.59% 16.67% 14.78% 14.15% 17.76% 13.88% 15.67% 15.19% 15.98% 
Provisions 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -3.82% 2.56% 0.27% 1.71% 0.97% 
Operating cash flow before working capital 103.47% 78.24% 101.80% 142.65% 59.07% 97.30% 108.93% 106.72% 106.87% 105.78% 
NWC 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Decrease/(increase) in stock 0.55% 0.51% -2.00% -3.63% 5.36% 9.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Decrease/(increase) in debtors 0.00% -4.97% 11.35% -4.97% 7.12% -5.91% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Increase/(decrease) in creditors 0.00% 28.43% -1.41% -26.39% 39.22% 10.35% 4.07% 4.70% 4.66% 5.02% 
Taxation paid -4.02% -2.20% -9.74% -7.66% -10.76% -11.05% -13.00% -11.42% -11.53% -10.80% 
CASH FLOW FROM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES 0.00% -59.52% -78.27% -125.68% -35.83% 2.06% -60.05% -48.85% -48.57% -46.94% 
Interest received 0.00% 0.86% 0.87% 0.47% 0.36% 0.35% 0.25% 0.25% 0.22% 0.21% 
Proceeds from sale of fixed assets 0.00% 0.05% 0.87% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Purchase of fixed assets 0.00% -14.28% -16.64% -24.94% -10.46% -8.75% -6.28% -6.50% -5.79% -5.59% 
Player registrations * -18.27% -46.15% -63.37% -101.23% -25.74% 10.46% -54.03% -42.60% -43.01% -41.57% 
Payment for purchase of players 0.00% -71.57% -78.16% -110.05% -98.62% -111.64% -135.33% -132.50% -126.08% -126.59% 
Receipts from sale of players 0.00% 25.41% 14.79% 8.82% 72.88% 122.10% 81.31% 89.89% 83.07% 85.02% 
CASH FLOW FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 0.00% -20.23% -23.73% -20.08% -18.15% -22.63% -16.03% -16.41% -14.41% -13.74% 
Interest paid 0.00% -12.97% -14.76% -12.10% -10.49% -13.66% -9.27% -9.04% -7.53% -6.77% 
Repayment of debt 0.00% -7.26% -8.97% -7.98% -7.66% -8.97% -6.76% -7.36% -6.88% -6.97% 
INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 89.41% 20.25% -2.00% -45.76% 46.03% 79.42% 23.91% 34.74% 37.01% 39.32% 
Cash and cash equivalents at start of year 252.11% 207.49% 266.83% 223.59% 161.83% 260.75% 240.79% 270.69% 268.18% 290.77% 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 341.52% 227.74% 264.83% 177.83% 207.85% 340.17% 264.71% 305.44% 305.19% 330.09% 
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Appendix 3: Key Performance Indicators 
 
Key Financial Ratios FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 2020F 2019F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Liquidity Ratios                     
Current Ratio 1.44 1.18 1.27 1.24 1.46 1.43 1.30 1.50 1.60 1.70 
Quick Ratio 1.19 0.93 1.06 0.97 1.08 1.14 1.04 1.22 1.32 1.42 
Cash Ratio 1.02 0.83 0.94 0.84 0.94 1.05 0.95 1.13 1.24 1.34 
Efficiency Ratios                     
Total Assets Turnover 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 
Accounts Receivables Turnover 7.41 11.68 12.98 15.02 12.82 16.63 13.30 16.86 18.47 19.43 
Profitability Ratios                     
EBITDA Margin 23.4% 31.3% 25.5% 35.8% 46.3% 45.4% 39.4% 44.4% 45.1% 45.0% 
EBIT Margin 5.9% 10.9% 4.6% 14.0% 19.6% 21.4% 14.5% 18.3% 18.8% 17.5% 
Net Profit Margin 2.4% 5.8% 0.5% 8.3% 14.0% 15.8% 9.6% 13.4% 14.1% 13.2% 
ROA 0.9% 2.2% 0.2% 4.0% 5.5% 6.7% 3.7% 5.4% 5.8% 5.3% 
ROE 2.37% 6.24% 0.50% 10.21% 14.44% 15.86% 9.48% 11.88% 12.11% 10.63% 
EPS 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.06% 0.09% 0.13% 0.07% 0.11% 0.13% 0.12% 
Solvency Ratios                     
Debt Ratio 28.8% 25.4% 23.7% 22.7% 18.8% 14.8% 16.6% 13.2% 11.7% 10.2% 
Long-term Debt Ratio 28.0% 24.7% 22.9% 21.8% 18.0% 14.0% 15.8% 12.4% 10.9% 9.5% 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.46 0.33 0.40 0.28 0.23 0.19 
Debt to EBITDA 3.41 2.17 2.31 1.32 1.04 0.78 1.08 0.74 0.63 0.56 
Interest Coverage Ratio 1.36 2.93 1.21 4.03 9.01 9.47 5.37 8.64 10.28 10.69 
Value Creation and Cash Flow Ratios                     
Debt Coverage  0.03 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.29 0.45 0.23 0.41 0.50 0.52 
Cash to Income 0.29 0.44 0.38 0.56 0.48 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.30 
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Appendix 4: Top tier European competitions winners 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Peer`s selection 
 
Multiple Valuation should start with the peers identification and according to Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) Arsenal is classified as an Entertainment company, however the quoted football clubs are just a small 
part of the entire segment and so data from entertainment industry is not representative of football segment due to huge 
differences in key drivers of profitability or target customers. Based on this fact, a deep look of the entertainment 
companies should be done to select just the quoted football clubs as the correct peer group. Unfortunately, the major 
part of the sportive clubs that were defined as closest sportive rivals of Arsenal are not quoted, and so I had to take 
another approach to have a reasonable amount of comparable companies. I started by selected all the quoted European 
football clubs. The second step was to perform a cluster analysis by removing the clubs that were not in the Top 30 of 
UEFA Ten-year club coefficients, which rank the clubs according to the sportive performance. Variables as profitability, 
risk, and growth were not taken into consideration to perform the cluster analyses because it just would serve to cut the 
shortlist of few European clubs that are publicity traded. The resulting peer group reached with this process was 
composed by seven firms from five different countries. Olympique Lyonnais Groupe SA, Sport Lisboa e Benfica-Futebol 
SAD ,Futebol clube do Porto, Juventus Football Club SpA, Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co KgaA, AS Roma SpA and 
Manchester United Plc were the final peer group. 
 
  
2017/18 Real Madrid Manchester City Bayern Munich Juventus FC FC Barcelona Paris Saint-Germain
2016/17 Real Madrid Chelsea FC Bayern Munich Juventus FC Real Madrid AS Monaco
2015/16 Real Madrid Leicester City Bayern Munich Juventus FC FC Barcelona Paris Saint-Germain
2014/15 FC Barcelona Chelsea FC Bayern Munich Juventus FC FC Barcelona Paris Saint-Germain
2013/14 Real Madrid Manchester City Bayern Munich Juventus FC Atlético Madrid Paris Saint-Germain
2012/13 Bayern Munich Manchester United Bayern Munich Juventus FC FC Barcelona Paris Saint-Germain
2011/12 Chelsea FC Manchester City Borussia Dortmund Juventus FC Real Madrid HSC Montpellier
2010/11 FC Barcelona Manchester United Borussia Dortmund AC Milan FC Barcelona LOSC Lille
2009/10 FC Internazionale Chelsea FC Bayern Munich FC Internazionale FC Barcelona Olympique Marseille
2008/09 FC Barcelona Manchester United VfL Wolfsburg FC Internazionale FC Barcelona FC Gir. Bordeaux
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Appendix 6: Transfers Assumption 
Transfers assumption was done based on the values of the sportive peers, the ones that have dominated national and 
international competitions. With TransferMarkt as source, was calculated the ratio of the amount spent in acquisitions 
of player registrations and the amount received with the disposal of player registrations. This ratio was calculated for 
the last three seasons. The ratios of FC Porto and SL Benfica were excluded due to the differences in the approach of 
the transfers market which would bias the final target ratio. The average of the median of each year were used to 
eliminate some extreme values, with an average of 1.54. 
 
Season 2015/16 Season 2016/17 Season 2017/18 
# Club   Expenditures Income Exp/Inc # Club   Expenditures Income Exp/Inc # Club   Expenditures Income Exp/Inc 
1 ENG Manchester City 187.47 60.69 3.09 1 ENG Manchester City 192.15 31.82 6.04 1 SPA FC Barcelona 337.05 209.25 1.61 
2 ENG Manchester United 140.40 91.86 1.53 1 ITA Juventus FC 176.24 157.42 1.12 1 ENG Manchester City 285.75 82.22 3.48 
1 ITA Juventus FC 136.53 71.57 1.91 2 ENG Manchester United 166.50 42.44 3.92 2 ENG Chelsea FC 234.45 180.54 1.30 
2 SPA Atlético Madrid 129.25 145.80 0.89 1 FRA Paris Saint-Germain 121.05 53.82 2.25 1 FRA Paris Saint-Germain 214.20 88.56 2.42 
3 ENG Liverpool FC 112.86 81.50 1.38 3 ENG Chelsea FC 119.52 97.56 1.23 4 ENG Manchester United 178.56 40.95 4.36 
1 FRA Paris Saint-Germain 104.49 20.61 5.07 1 SPA FC Barcelona 112.28 30.42 3.69 5 ENG Liverpool FC 156.49 175.05 0.89 
3 SPA Real Madrid 83.25 14.09 5.91 4 ENG Arsenal FC 101.74 9.32 10.92 2 ITA Juventus FC 146.61 131.13 1.12 
5 ENG Chelsea FC 81.45 78.74 1.03 5 ENG Tottenham Hotspur 75.15 47.07 1.60 6 ENG Arsenal FC 137.57 140.58 0.98 
7 ENG Tottenham Hotspur 63.90 78.82 0.81 6 ENG Liverpool FC 71.91 76.84 0.94 7 ENG Tottenham Hotspur 109.35 93.42 1.17 
4 SPA FC Barcelona 45.90 34.47 1.33 3 SPA Atlético Madrid 71.10 37.80 1.88 2 SPA Atlético Madrid 91.80 75.15 1.22 
21 ENG Arsenal FC 23.85 2.25 10.60 6 SPA Real Madrid 27.00 33.75 0.80 6 SPA Real Madrid 36.45 115.65 0.32 
                  
    Median 104.49 71.57 1.53     Median 112.28 42.44 1.88     Median 156.49 115.65 1.22 
    Average 100.85 61.85 3.05     Average 112.24 56.21 3.13     Average 175.30 121.14 1.71 
                  
Outliers- Different market transfers approach Outliers- Different market transfers approach Outliers- Different market transfers approach 
1   FC Porto 38.97 126.68 0.31 1   SL Benfica 39.39 109.22 0.36 2   FC Porto 22.40 63.18 0.35 
2   SL Benfica 31.82 93.87 0.34 2   FC Porto 38.19 13.55 2.82 3   SL Benfica 8.96 123.48 0.07 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: AFC most expensive PT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1- Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang    
   From 2017/18 £57.38m    
2- Alexandre Lacazette       3- Mesut Özil   
From   2017/18 £47.70m       From  2013/14 £42.30m 
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Appendix 8: WACC Assumptions 
 
 
WACC Compuation 
  FY 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F Terminal Value 
Corporate Tax 20% 19% 19% 17% 17% 17% 17% 
Unlevered Beta 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 
Levered Beta 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.257 0.256 0.255 0.255 
Country risk premium (CRP) 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 
Market Risk Premium (MRP) 6.65% 6.65% 6.65% 6.65% 6.65% 6.65% 6.65% 
Market  Risk 7.12% 7.25% 7.41% 7.62% 7.88% 8.22% 8.65% 
RFR 0.47% 0.60% 0.76% 0.97% 1.23% 1.57% 2.00% 
Equity Market Value (E) 2,146 2,146 2,146 2,146 2,146 2,146 2,146 
Debt Book Value (D) 193.43 185.47 176.99 167.97 158.37 148.15 150.94 
V 2,339.61 2,339.61 2,339.61 2,339.61 2,339.61 2,339.61 2,339.61 
D/E 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Equity Weights 91.73% 91.78% 91.82% 91.87% 91.91% 91.96% 92% 
Debt Weights 8.27% 8.22% 8.18% 8.13% 8.09% 8.04% 8.00% 
Cost of Equity (Re) 2.88% 3.00% 3.16% 3.37% 3.63% 3.96% 4.39% 
Cost of Debt (Rd) 5.82% 5.86% 5.86% 5.86% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 
WACC 3.02% 3.15% 3.29% 3.49% 3.72% 4.03% 4.42% 
Terminal Growth rate             1.89% 
 
 
Cost of Debt was calculated according to debt book value, as a proxy of market value. AFC incurred into three different 
debt financings: Fixed rate bonds, Floating rate bonds and debentures loans. For all these sources of capital, AFC has 
fixed the interest rate by using financial instruments. Fixed rate bonds have an average fixed rate of 5,8%, floating rate 
bonds have 7% and debenture loans 2,8%. Repayments of debt divided by total debt is the cost of debt, ranging from 
5,82% to 5,85%. 
 
𝑅𝑑 =
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
 
Cost of Equity was calculated by using CAPM. In order to apply CAPM model, four different variables were needed. 
Since AFC is a UK based company, and the demand is mainly locally related, I decided to use UK as the starting point 
to select the RFR, CRP and MRP. Cost of equity ranges from 2.88% to 4.39%. 
 
𝑅𝑒 =  𝑅𝐹𝑅 +  𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽𝐿 × 𝑀𝑅𝑃  
 
Market Risk Premium and Country Risk Premium: MRP and CRP were extracted from Damodaran database. CRP 
should be applied when some political instability is present in the related country, as the case of UK with Brexit. MRP 
was defined at 6,65% and CRP assumed a value of 0,69%. MRP can be calculated by using Sharpe ratio. This ratio 
should be the average return of UK index minus 10Y UK bonds per unit of UK Index volatility. 
 
Risk-Free Rate: The reference for RFR was the UK 10Y bonds, using Bloomberg as source. 
 
Beta- Pure-Play Method: I decided to use the Pure-Play method to calculate the Levered Beta of Arsenal. To perform 
this method, I started by collecting the levered betas of the companies defined as the peer group from Bloomberg as 
well as their capital structures and tax rates to have inputs to deleverage all the betas. I calculated a weight average of 
the betas considering a percentage of 66.66% to Manchester United and 33.33% for the remaining peers.  
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  Levered Beta Index Debt to Equity tax rate Unlevered beta 
OLG FP 0.58 CAC 1.051 32% 0.338 
FCP PL 0.12 PSI20 (7.313) 21% (0.025) 
SLBEN PL 0.96 PSI20 1.963 21% 0.376 
JUVE IM 1.23 FTSEMIB 4.569 24% 0.275 
BVB GR 0.77 DAX 0.033 33% 0.753 
ASR IM 0.77 FTSEMIB (2.527) 24% (0.837) 
MANU US 0.61 SPX 1.411 21% 0.288 
Weight Average         0.241 
 
 
The resulting estimated unlevered beta was levered by using Arsenal capital structure market value as well as the 
effective tax rate for each year. 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑈 × [1 +
𝐷
𝐸
× (1 − 𝑡)] 
 
Weight Average Cost of Capital: WACC was calculated based on Debt and Equity Market Value. For equity value 
was considered the share price of the last trading day (£34,495) multiplied by total shares. Debt book value was used 
as an approximation of debt market value. 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑅𝑒 ×
𝐸
𝐸 + 𝐷
+ Rd ×
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
× (1 − 𝑡) 
 
Terminal Value Assumptions 
TV WACC rate was done by assuming a target Capital Structure of 8% Debt and 92% Equity. RFR was adjusted to 
converge to 2% in the TV. TV growth rate was obtained by using Reinvestment rate and ROE. The resulting TV g was 
adjusted to converge for UK GDP in 2023F, the last forecast year. To adjust the TV g a reduction of 100 basis points 
was done, to a final value of 1.89%, in line with the UK GDP forecast of 1.69%. TV free cash flow was calculated by 
multiplying the last FCFF with TV growth rate. 
 
𝑇𝑉 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹2023𝐹 × 𝑔
𝑔 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
 
 
𝑔 = 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑅𝑂𝐸 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − 𝐷&𝐴) + ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡)
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝐷
𝐸
× [𝑅𝑂𝐴 − 𝑅𝑑 × (1 − 𝑡)] 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡 × (1 − 𝑡) + 𝐷&𝐴𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡 
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Appendix 9: DCF 
 
 
Map of Cash Flows 
  2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 TV 
EBIT(1-t) 63.15 51.35 86.77 77.30 87.08 85.21   
D&A 107.76 108.36 120.44 132.83 146.43 160.84   
CapEx 175.51 154.66 176.89 179.24 195.78 205.65   
Change in WCR (57.54) (12.20) (5.10) (5.76) (6.51) (7.35)   
FCFF 52.93 17.24 35.42 36.65 44.23 47.74 48.64 
        
WACC Method 
PV(FCFF) by using WACC 52.93 17.79 37.79 40.62 51.20 58.17 1,544.11 
 
 
Appendix 10: Multiples Valuation 
 
EV/EBITDA FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018    
OLG FP 666.78 5.10 3.95 2.28  EV/EBITDA    
FCP PL 1.25 8.17 4.31 4.08  
AFC EBITDA 186.73 
SLBEN PL 4.08 3.75 2.70 2.60  
Multiple 10.73 
JUVE IM 3.94 3.47 2.24 4.37  EV 2,002.90 
BVB GR 4.69 4.40 7.44 3.69  
AFC Debt (37.91) 
ASR IM 29.25 2.62 2.86 4.26  
Outstanding 
shares 62,217 
MANU US 14.94 13.61 10.90 15.14  
Share Price 32,801.51 
Weight Average 12.71 10.46 8.48 11.25  
Difference 11.50% 
Total Average 10.73    
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Appendix 11: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
  WACC TV 
   
   
Te
rm
in
al
 g
ro
w
h
t 
ra
te
 
29,582.24 3.79% 3.99% 4.20% 4.42% 4.65% 4.88% 5.12% 
1.62% 34,522.53 31,760.62 29,317.13 27,143.35 25,289.99 23,617.41 22,102.64 
1.70% 35,760.51 32,787.77 30,174.52 27,862.83 25,901.57 24,139.22 22,549.32 
1.79% 37,177.47 33,954.85 31,142.46 28,670.46 26,584.77 24,719.60 23,044.20 
1.89% 38,812.94 35,290.65 32,242.27 29,582.24 27,351.89 25,368.10 23,594.74 
1.98% 40,618.69 36,751.75 33,435.47 30,564.43 28,173.33 26,058.84 24,178.36 
2.08% 42,728.78 38,441.01 34,802.47 31,680.82 29,100.87 26,834.26 24,830.13 
2.18% 45,223.98 40,413.88 36,382.19 32,959.29 30,155.13 27,709.83 25,561.79 
         
         
         
  Country risk premium (CRP) TV 
   
  R
is
k 
fr
e
e
 r
at
e
 
29,582.24 0.59% 0.62% 0.66% 0.69% 0.72% 0.76% 0.80% 
1.71% 34,071.98 33,652.64 33,222.86 32,782.85 32,355.02 31,918.38 31,473.18 
1.81% 32,889.98 32,500.78 32,101.52 31,692.35 31,294.12 30,887.29 30,472.08 
1.90% 31,736.64 31,375.81 31,005.31 30,625.25 30,255.00 29,876.39 29,489.60 
2.00% 30,612.48 30,278.31 29,934.87 29,582.24 29,238.39 28,886.45 28,526.56 
2.10% 29,570.67 29,260.32 28,941.10 28,613.05 28,292.89 27,964.91 27,629.23 
2.21% 28,555.93 28,267.98 27,971.55 27,666.66 27,368.85 27,063.51 26,750.73 
2.32% 27,568.48 27,301.56 27,026.54 26,743.45 26,466.70 26,182.72 25,891.57 
         
         
  Unlevered Beta 
   
   
   
   
   
 D
/E
 
29,582.24 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 
0.060 32,400.03 31,496.97 30,602.46 29,717.57 28,885.72 28,064.35 27,254.24 
0.063 32,355.73 31,453.07 30,559.00 29,674.61 28,843.28 28,022.46 27,212.96 
0.067 32,309.25 31,407.00 30,513.40 29,629.53 28,798.75 27,978.52 27,169.65 
0.070 32,260.47 31,358.66 30,465.56 29,582.24 28,752.03 27,932.43 27,124.22 
0.074 32,211.85 31,310.48 30,417.88 29,535.11 28,705.48 27,886.50 27,078.96 
0.078 32,160.96 31,260.05 30,367.98 29,485.80 28,656.77 27,838.45 27,031.61 
0.081 32,107.71 31,207.30 30,315.78 29,434.21 28,605.82 27,788.18 26,982.08 
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Appendix 12: Arsenal Holdings Limited subsidiary companies (* = indirectly held)  
 
Arsenal Holdings Limited 
Subsidiary Name Country of Incorporation Principal activity Ordinary shares owned 
Arsenal (AFC Holdings) Limited Great Britain Share holding 100% 
The Arsenal Football Club plc* Great Britain Professional football club 100% 
Arsenal (Emirates Stadium) Limited* Great Britain Property development 100% 
Arsenal Overseas Holdings Limited* Great Britain Share holding 100% 
AOH-USA, LLC* USA Data management 100% 
Arsenal Overseas Limited* Jersey Retail operations 100% 
Arsenal Securities plc* Great Britain Financing 100% 
Arsenal Stadium Management Company Limited* Great Britain Stadium operations 100% 
ATL (Holdings) Limited Great Britain Share holding 100% 
Ashburton Trading Limited* Great Britain Property development 100% 
HHL Holding Company Limited Great Britain Share holding 100% 
Highbury Holdings Limited* Great Britain Property holding 100% 
Arsenal Women Football Club Limited* Great Britain Women's football 100% 
Arsenal Football Club Asia PTE Limited* Singapore Commercial operations 100% 
Ashburton Properties (Northern Triangle) Limited* Great Britain Dormant 100% 
Drayton Park Trading Limited* Great Britain Dormant 100% 
Queensland Road Trading Limited* Great Britain Dormant 100% 
Ashburton Properties Holdings Limited Great Britain Dormant 100% 
Arsenal Stadium Management Holdings Limited Great Britain Dormant 100% 
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Abbreviations 
 
AFC- Arsenal Holdings PLC 
AFConf - Asian Football Confederation  
AS- André Salvado 
b- billions 
BS- Balance Sheet 
CAF-Confédération Africaine de Football  
CAGR Compounded Annual Growth Rate  
CapEx Capital Expenditure  
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CONCACAF-Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football 
CONMEBOL -Confederations Sudamericana de Fútbol  
CRP- Country risk premium 
D- Debt 
D&A- Depreciations & Amortizations 
E- Equity 
EBIT- Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  
EBITDA- Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
EBITPT- Earnings before interest taxes and Players Transfers 
EU- European Union 
EV Enterprise Value 
F- Forecast 
FCF- Free Cash Flow  
FCFF- Free Cash Flow to the Firm  
FFP- Financial Fair Play 
FIFA-Fédération International de Football Association 
FY- Fiscal Year 
GDP- Gross Domestic Product 
IS- Income Statement 
KPI- Key Performance Indicators 
m- millions 
MRP- Market Risk Premium  
NWC- Net Working Capital 
OFC -Oceania Football Confederation 
PL- Premier League 
PPE- Property Plant and Equipment 
PR- Player Registration  
PT- Player Transaction 
Rd- Cost of Debt 
Re- Cost of Equity 
RFR- Risk Free Rate 
ROA- Return on Assets 
ROE- Return on Equity 
TV- Terminal Value 
UCL- UEFA Champions League 
UEFA -Union des associations européennes de football 
UEL- UEFA Europe League 
Y- Year 
YoY- Year on Year 
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